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When you see something that is technically sweet, you go ahead and do it. 
J. R. Oppenheimer, scientific leader of the Manhattan Project. 
 
 
As was recognized by Bentham1, skillfulness is an important source of pleasure. 
Humans like achievement and to excel in tasks relevant to them 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
This paper provides controlled experimental evidence that striving for pleasures 
of skill can have negative moral consequences and causally reduce moral values. 
In the study, subjects perform an IQ-test. They know that each correctly solved 
question not only increases test performance but also the likelihood of moral 
transgression. In terms of self-image, this creates a trade-off between signaling 
excellence and immoral disposition. We contrast performance in the IQ-test to 
test scores in an otherwise identical test, which is, however, framed as a simple 
questionnaire with arguably lower self-relevance. We find that subjects perform 
significantly better in the IQ-test condition, and thus become more willing to 
support morally problematic consequences. Willingness to reduce test 
performance in order to behave more morally is significantly less pronounced in 
the IQ versus the more neutral context. The findings provide controlled and 
causal evidence that the desire to succeed in a challenging, self-relevant task has 
the potential to seduce subjects into immoral behaviors and to significantly 
decrease values attached to moral outcomes.  
 
In science, perhaps the most striking example illustrating the tension between 
pleasures of skill and moral conflict considers the development of the atomic bomb. 
The Manhattan project was one of the most challenging engineering and scientific 
projects of the twentieth century, bringing together leading physicists of the time and 
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providing scientists with a unique opportunity to excel10. Physicist Richard Feynman 
stated about the Manhattan Project: “… we started for a good reason, then you’re 
working very hard to accomplish something and it’s a pleasure, it’s excitement. And 
you stop thinking, you know; you just stop”11. Even after knowing about the 
devastating power of the bomb, for “many of the physicists, the initial reaction was 
excitement over a spectacular demonstration of the successful ‘technologically sweet’ 
joint effort leading up to ‘the gadget’, as it was known” 12. Another member of the 
Manhattan Project, Australian physicist Sir Mark Oliphant, commented that he 
“learned during the war that if … the work's exciting they'll work on anything”, and 
continued that there is “no difficulty getting doctors to work on chemical warfare and 
physicists to work on nuclear warfare”13. However, after the dropping of the 
plutonium bomb on Nagasaki, which was deemed unjustified by many of the 
scientists, numerous members of the Manhattan Project started worrying about moral 
implications. Many suffered from feelings of depression, nausea, guilt and, in some 
cases, outright horror13, 14, 15. 
Conceptually, it has been argued that both the desire for signaling skillfulness 
and acting in accordance with moral values originate from the same source, a desire 
for positive self-image16, 17, 18, 19. This desire may stem from an uncertainty about who 
we are, how skillful, and how moral. If a task is morally difficult, but also considered 
as suitable for proving skillfulness, people may find it difficult to resist working on it. 
Our study investigates behavior in a decision context where the same activity 
simultaneously signals positive self-image with regard to one’s skills, but negative 
self-image in the realm of morality, and reveals that this conflict bears the potential 
for moral transgression.  
 
A paradigm for studying pleasures of skill and moral behavior. To identify 
potentially adverse effects of pleasures of skill on moral behavior, in our two main 
treatments we implemented a morally problematic task and varied whether or not 
subjects consider the task self-relevant in terms of skillfulness20. In order to confirm 
that the decision environment in our main treatments is of moral relevance to subjects, 
we ran two otherwise identical control conditions in a morally neutral environment. 
In all four conditions subjects were administered the same task, a 52-item 
intelligence test. The test included items for fluid intelligence (Raven matrices) as 
well as crystallized intelligence (vocabulary test questions). Test scores were not 
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incentivized. In all conditions subjects only received a show-up fee of 15 euros, i.e., 
payment was never performance dependent. At the end of the test, subjects were 
informed about their test score, together with the information whether they had 
performed above or below average, in comparison to other students who had taken 
part in the same test before. This average is based on about 1,700 observations from 
other students. Subjects knew that these students had participated in the test in 
previous and unrelated experiments. 
To vary the self-relevance of the test we framed it either as an “IQ test” or 
simply as a “questionnaire”. In the IQ-conditions (IQ) the instructions informed 
subjects that they are taking part in an IQ test, and that IQ is a crucial skill that is 
associated with important life outcomes such as wages or educational achievement. In 
contrast, in the No_IQ conditions subjects were told that they are taking part in a 
questionnaire study, without mentioning any connection to intelligence. 
We chose an IQ test and varied the framing for two reasons. First, IQ is 
arguably one of the most important and universal personal characteristics in 
determining overall success in life21, 22, 23. For example, IQ is related to educational 
achievement, employment prospects, wealth acquisition and career outcomes. It is 
self-evident that people prefer a higher to a lower IQ and like to think of themselves 
(and have others think of them) as rather intelligent. The task therefore ensures high 
ecological validity in representing a measure of positive self-image with regard to 
skills. Second, using an IQ test allows us to easily vary the meaning and self-
relevance of the task, by means of different framing, while sticking to the same task 
across all treatments. This is an essential feature of our experiment as it permits 
treatment comparisons relying on identical tasks24.  
Moral consequences were implemented using the Mouse Paradigm25. The 
paradigm involves the killing of mice, which is morally objectionable since killing an 
animal implies causing harm in an intentional and unjustified way. While there exists 
no universal consensus about how to define the content of morality, avoiding and 
preventing harm is a central element according to most notions of morality26. In 
contrast to choice paradigms that involve monetary payments, our choice context 
involves drastic and irreversible consequences27. In the Mouse conditions, each 
subject was “endowed” with a mouse. Subjects knew that their mouse is a young and 
healthy mouse, which will live in an appropriate, enriched environment, jointly with a 
few other mice, if it is not killed. To rule out any uncertainty about consequences, the 
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instructions also informed subjects explicitly about the killing process: “The mouse is 
gassed. The gas flows slowly into the hermetically sealed cage. The gas leads to 
breathing arrest. At the point at which the mouse is not visibly breathing anymore, it 
remains in the cage for another 10 minutes. It will then be removed.” As part of the 
instructions, subjects were also presented a picture of a mouse and a short 
demonstration video of the killing process28. In the video, four mice first move vividly 
in the cage, then they successively slow down. Eventually they die, with their hearts 
beating visibly heavy and slow. 
It is important to stress that all mice used in the experiment are so-called 
“surplus” mice. They were bred for animal experiments, but turned out unsuited or 
unneeded for current animal studies. Such mice are perfectly healthy, but keeping 
them alive is costly. It is common practice in laboratories conducting animal 
experiments to gas surplus mice. Our study made it possible to rescue these animals. 
Surplus mice that were saved by subjects’ behavior were purchased by the 
experimenters and are kept in enriched conditions, precisely as stated in the 
instructions. Thus, as a consequence of our experiment, many mice that would have 
otherwise died were saved. 
Subjects in the Mouse conditions faced a morally problematic consequence of 
succeeding in the task: They were informed in the instructions that for each correctly 
answered question in the test, the likelihood that their mouse would be killed 
increased by 0.9 percentage points. This leads to a maximum killing probability of 
46.8 percent, in case all questions are answered correctly. Subjects knew that the 
killing probability (between zero and 46.8 percent) resulting from their performance 
in the test was used to determine whether their mouse was killed or not. To allow 
subjects to save their mouse with certainty, each of the 52 test items included the 
possible response option “don’t know” (this holds for all four treatment conditions). 
This way subjects could answer each question incorrectly with certainty if they 
wanted to, independently of whether they knew the correct answers to the test 
questions. 
In total we study four treatment conditions, see Table 1. In all four conditions 
the 52-item test was exactly the same. Possible experimenter demand effects, e.g., in 
the sense that subjects experienced pressure to complete the test, or had a desire to 
outperform former participants, are kept constant between conditions. The two main 
treatments IQ and NoIQ differ only in the framing of the test either as self-relevant in 
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terms of skillfulness, or neutral. Our two control treatments vary the framing of the 
task in an identical way but implement a decision environment that is morally neutral. 
In both Control_IQ and Control_NoIQ, subjects just performed the task without any 
further consequences. A total of 301 undergraduate students were randomly assigned 
to one of the four treatment conditions (between subject design)29. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Design overview and treatment variations.  
 
The main hypothesis to be tested was that pleasures of skill involve the potential to 
reduce moral behavior. In an environment in which pursuing pleasures of skill causes 
negative moral consequences, decision makers face two competing sources of self-
image16, 18, 19. Our treatments exogenously vary self-relevance of performance and 
therefore allow studying our question of interest in a tightly controlled way. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that subjects are more willing to sacrifice the life of a 
mouse in order to obtain a high and self-relevant “IQ” score rather than performing 
well in the more neutral “questionnaire” condition. Thus test scores should be higher 
in IQ than in NoIQ. To check whether subjects actually perceive task performance in 
our two main treatments as morally relevant we also compare test scores in IQ and 
NoIQ with those in Control_IQ and Control_NoIQ, respectively. Without morally 
problematic consequences, test scores should be higher in the latter two conditions, 
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compared to the two main treatments. Furthmermore, the comparison of willingness 
to reduce test performance to save the mouse in IQ versus NoIQ allows to 
approximate the value of the mouse life per se. This moral value may be lower in IQ 
compared to NoIQ, if subjects causally lower their perceptions of what is a moral 
value in the IQ context. 
 
Pleasures of skill undermine moral behavior. Figure 1 displays the cumulative 
distribution functions of total test scores for the two main treatment conditions. The 
figure shows a clear difference between test scores in the IQ condition (solid red line) 
and the NoIQ condition (solid black line). Mean test scores in IQ are 35.13 (std. dev. 
12.09), compared to 28.78 (std. dev. 15.62) in NoIQ. Thus, relative to NoIQ, subjects 
reach about 22 percent higher test scores. This difference is statistically significant 
(P<0.01, n=165, two-sided rank sum test).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Pleasures of skill undermine moral behavior. The figure displays cumulative 
distribution functions of total test scores for IQ (solid red line) and NoIQ (solid black 
line) as well as for the two control treatments (dotted lines). Test scores with negative 
moral consequences are significantly higher when framed as self-relevant in terms of 
skillfulness compared a neutral framing (P<0.01). 
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Comparing results from our control treatments with those of our main conditions 
further reveals that, as expected, adding a moral dimension reduces test scores. This 
holds for both the IQ conditions (P<0.01, n = 156, two-sided rank sum test) as well as 
the NoIQ conditions (P<0.01, n = 145, two-sided rank sum test). As can be inferred 
from Fig. 1, however, the decrease in performance is more pronounced in the NoIQ 
conditions than in the IQ conditions (P=0.013) (30). This difference-in-differences 
result shows that when adding moral consequences, moral transgression is more likely 
in a self-relevant context, in comparison to a more neutral choice context. This 
suggests that subjects causally reduce their perceptions of what is a moral value “per 
se” in the IQ context. According to the smaller reduction in performance in order to 
save the mouse in the IQ context, the value of the mouse life is causally lower than in 
the NoIQ context. 
A closer inspection of test score distributions across treatments shows that no 
subject scored below 29 in the morally neutral conditions. Thus 29 questions is a 
minimum bound of performance subjects are able to achieve in the test. In contrast, in 
the two main conditions, a sizable fraction of subjects scored below this minimum 
level. In NoIQ 32.1 percent of subjects scored strictly below 29, significantly more 
than in Control_NoIQ (P<0.01, Two Sample Test of Proportion, two-sided, n=145). 
Thus while most of these subjects solved some test questions correctly, they 
apparently tried to ensure a relatively high likelihood of survival of their mouse and 
therefore reduced their test taking efforts. A possible interpretation is that subjects 
tried to find a compromise between revealing that they are capable of solving at least 
some of the questions and behaving morally. In the IQ condition such a compromise 
is rarely observed. Only 11.9 percent of subjects scored below the minimum level of 
29, significantly less than in the No_IQ condition (P<0.01, Two Sample Test of 
Proportion, two-sided, n=165)31. This suggests that subjects in the IQ condition were 
keen to reach a rather high score placing relatively little weight on the life of their 
mouse. Among the few subjects who scored below 29, the majority solved exactly 
zero questions. Thus, these subjects ensured survival of their mouse with certainty, 
abstaining from pleasures of skill. 
 
Discussion. We have shown that pursuing pleasures of skill in a self-relevant activity 
favors moral transgression in a causal and significant way. The temptation to excel 
provides a powerful motive to detach oneself from moral consequences. Compared to 
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many real life situations, we believe that the decision context implemented in the 
experiment provides only a lower bound for the outcome relevance of this 
fundamental trade-off. First, in the Mouse conditions, moral consequences are 
transparent and unambiguous. Higher levels of performance immediately translate 
into higher killing probabilities. In addition, subjects were reminded of the 
consequences, saw the video about gassing mice and were told that mice that were 
saved would live in appropriate conditions. In contrast, in many real life scenarios 
actions and consequences are only indirectly linked, and consequences are often 
ambiguous. Second, task performance was not incentivized. Subjects received their 
show-up fee irrespective of performance and test score. They could easily save mice 
without any monetary loss. Third, the signal value of a high IQ score accrued only at 
the individual level; effects may be stronger if on top of pure self-signaling, monetary 
incentives, public recognition or reputation effects would become effective, in 
particular if moral consequences are ambiguous. In fact, in many real life applications 
material incentives, career or promotion concerns as well as public recognition are 
characteristic consequences of high performance. Finally, the desire to signal 
skillfulness may be more pronounced in tasks, which are of higher self-relevance than 
succeeding in an IQ-test. 
We believe that the trade-off between pleasures of skill and moral behavior, 
demonstrated in our study, is pervasive. People like to excel and enjoy pleasures of 
skill, regardless whether they are managers, bureaucrats, athletes or scientists. A 
problem arises if in doing a “good job”, managers support firms producing morally 
questionable products, such as chemical weapons or landmines, bureaucrats serve 
terror regimes32, athletes support cultures of doping33, or scientists violate norms of 
good scientific practice34, or develop research with potentially harmful implications, 
for example, because scientific inventions are misused. In these contexts, pursuing 
pleasures of skill exhibits the power to undermine morality.  
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1. Additional table 
 
 
Dependent variable: Test score 
Mouse dummy  -11.222*** 
 (1.795) 
IQ dummy .667 
(.611) 
Mouse-IQ-Interaction 
5.687** 
(2.266) 
  
Constant 40.0*** 
 (.454) 
  
Observations 301 
R-squared 0.171 
Table S1: OLS regression coefficient estimates, with test score as dependent variable 
and robust standard errors in parentheses. Mouse dummy is a dummy, which takes 
value 1 if observations come from mouse treatments. IQ dummy is a dummy, which 
takes value 1 if observations come from IQ treatments. Mouse-IQ-Interaction is an 
interaction of Mouse dummy and IQ dummy. *** indicate significance at the 1-
percent-level, ** indicate significance at the 5-percent-level. The P-value of the 
Mouse-IQ-Interaction coefficient is 0.013. It may seem surprising that the difference 
between Control_IQ and Control_NoIQ is not more pronounced. Note, however, that 
if subjects in an experiment are asked to take part in a questionnaire, without an 
interesting alternative, there is no reason why they should not do so. In both control 
conditions test scores have no moral consequences, and subjects may have 
experienced an ambition to perform above average. 
 
 
  
 15 
2. Mouse figure and video 
 
 
Fig. S1. Picture of a mouse as presented in the instructions of the experiment3 
 
 
Video: In the instructions subjects were informed about the process how mice are 
killed: “The mouse is gassed. The gas flows slowly into the hermetically sealed cage. 
The gas leads to breathing arrest. At the point at which the mouse is not visibly 
breathing anymore, it remains in the cage for another 10 minutes. It will then be 
removed.” They were also shown a short video: The mice first move vividly in the 
cage, then they successively slow down. Eventually they die, with their hearts beating 
visibly heavy and slow. Comparable demonstration videos are publicly available at 
laboratories conducting animal experiments. 
 
3. Procedural details. A total of 301 subjects (123 male, mean age = 20.19 (SD =  
2.63) undergraduate university students from various majors, took part in the 
experiments. All treatments were computerized using z-Tree as experimental software 
(1). Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE (2). The experiments were 
conducted in December 2013, at the Bonn Econ Lab. Subjects in all conditions only 
received a show-up fee of 15 euros.  
To ensure credibility of our paradigm, we stressed right at the beginning that 
all statements made in the instructions are true, as is standard in economic 
                                                
3 This picture is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 1.0 
Generic license, copyright by George Shuklin. 
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experiments, and that all consequences of subjects’ decisions are implemented exactly 
as stated.  
Subjects were randomly assigned into treatment condition and every subject 
participated only in one condition. At the beginning of an experimental session, 
participants received detailed information about the rules and structure of the 
experiment. As part of the experiment, subjects answered a short questionnaire 
including personality (Big-5), socio-demographics and a few questions on general 
values (political and religious orientation and whether they are vegetarians) as well as 
on final high school grades. 
 
4. Instructions  
In the following we provide an English translation of the instructions for the main two 
conditions, IQ and NoIQ (see 4.1 and 4.2). The two control conditions were identical 
in wording, respectively, with the only difference that no mouse live was involved. 
Translations for the two other treatments are available upon request. 
 
4.1 Instructions for the IQ treatment 
Thank you very much for your participation! For your participation you will receive 
15 euros. At the end of the experiment you will receive your money in cash. 
 
Please note: Throughout the whole experiment communication between the 
participants is not allowed. On the computer please only use the functions intended to 
be used. If you have questions please raise your hand. Your question will then be 
answered at your cubicle! 
 
Please note: All statements made in these instructions are true. This holds for all 
experiments carried out by the Bonn Econ Lab, and also for this experiment. In 
particular, all actions to be taken will be implemented exactly in the way they are 
described.  
 
15–item Big-5 survey 
	  
Test for the Measurement of Intelligence 
 
In a moment you will be taking part in an exercise to measure your intelligence. The 
test that has been developed for this purpose consists of two parts that are both part of 
established techniques to measure the intelligence quotient (IQ). Both tests are 
standardized and frequently used in cognitive psychology. 
Generally, intelligence is correlated with many factors of success in a person’s life. 
These comprise, among other things, educational success and average life income. 
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The first part is a vocabulary test and measures the so-called crystalline intelligence. 
This test part has no time limit. The second part is a matrix test and measures the so-
called fluid intelligence. This consists in turn of two phases, of which the second one 
has a time limit.  
 
Both components are central devices to measure a person’s overall intelligence. 
 
In general: The more questions you answer correctly, the higher is your measured 
intelligence quotient. 
 
The IQ-test you are going to work on in a moment has been conducted already with 
many students at the University of Bonn, in other experiments and as a part of a 
questionnaire without any further consequences. At the end of the IQ-test, we are 
going to tell you how well you performed in comparison to other students. To this 
end, you are going to learn how many questions on average students have previously 
answered correctly. You can then compare this value with your result. Your result in 
the questionnaire has another consequence for a mouse. 
 
Details on the mouse 
 
 
(Figure shown to subjects in the instructions.) 
 
At issue is a healthy, young mouse. It lives with some other mice together in a small 
group. The expected lifetime of this mouse is approximately two years. The more 
questions you answer correctly, the higher is the probability that your mouse gets 
killed. 
 
For each correctly answered question in the test, this probability increases by 0.9 
percentage points. The maximal likelihood (if all questions are answered correctly) is 
46.8 percent. Hence, if you, for example, answer 30 questions correctly, the 
probability is 27 percent; for 0 correctly answered questions, it is 0 percent; for 15 
correctly answered questions, it is 13.5 percent; for 40 correctly answered questions, 
it is 36 percent etc. 
 
If the probability is larger than 0 percent, a random generator determines according to 
this probability whether the mouse dies or lives.  
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Details on the killing process 
 
If the random generator determines, according to this probability, that the mouse dies, 
the mouse is gassed. The gas flows slowly into the hermetically sealed cage. The gas 
leads to breathing arrest. As soon as the mouse is not visibly breathing anymore, it 
remains in the cage for another 10 minutes. It will then be removed. 
 
Summary 
 
In a moment you can start with the IQ-test. After finishing the tasks, you get to know 
whether your intelligence result is above or below the average of other students who 
participated in the test in other experiments. For this purpose, we will tell you your 
result and the average. The more questions you answer correctly, the higher is the 
probability that the mouse is killed. 
 
Please press “Continue” when you have read the instructions. (Button “Continue”) 
 
Video 
 
To visualize the killing of mice by gas, you will in the following see an excerpt of a 
documentation video (30 seconds). The mouse will be killed in an identical way. 
 
Video 
 
You can now start with the test. The more questions you answer correctly, the higher 
is the measured intelligence. 
 
 
4.2 Instructions for the NoIQ treatment 
Thank you very much for your participation! For your participation you will receive 
15 euros. At the end of the experiment you will receive your money in cash. 
 
Please note: Throughout the whole experiment communication between the 
participants is not allowed. On the computer please only use the functions intended to 
be used. If you have questions please raise your hand. Your question will then be 
answered at your cubicle! 
 
Please note: All statements made in these instructions are true. This holds for all 
experiments carried out by the Bonn Econ Lab, and also for this experiment. In 
particular, all actions to be taken will be implemented exactly in the way they are 
described.  
 
15–item Big-5 survey 
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Test 
 
In a moment you will be taking part in another questionnaire. The first part is about 
guessing words. The second part is about a hands-on assignment of symbols. The 
answering of the questions in the questionnaire has no further impact for you.  
 
The questionnaire you are going to work on in a moment has been conducted already 
with many students at the University of Bonn, in other experiments and as a part of a 
questionnaire without any further consequences. At the end of the questionnaire, we 
are going to tell you how well you performed in comparison to other students. To this 
end, you are going to learn how many questions on average the students have 
previously answered correctly. You can then compare this value with your result. 
Your result in the questionnaire has further consequences for a mouse. 
 
Details on the mouse 
 
(See 4.1.) 
 
Details on the killing process 
 
(See 4.1.) 
Summary 
 
In a moment you can start with the questionnaire. After finishing the tasks, you get to 
know whether your result is above or below the average of other students who 
participated in the test in other experiments. To this end, we are going to tell you your 
result and the average. The more questions you answer correctly, the higher is the 
probability that the mouse is killed. 
 
 
Please press “Continue” when you have read the instructions. (Button “Continue”) 
 
Video 
 
(See 4.1.) 
 
Video 
 
You can now start with the test. 
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